Glossary of terms:
Geneva Accords 1954: international agreement ending 8 year war between France and Vietnam. Vietnam divided along 17th parallel, Viet Minh control the North, US backed Diem regime controlled the south. Elections due in July 1956 to unify state. No elections held in the south.
“Great Society” May 1964 at University of Michigan President Johnson set out his vision foe what he referred to as a “great society”, key element of his election campaign. Called for end of poverty and racism and aimed to address problems in cities, education and environment. GS included Medicare, Medicaid and civil rights legislation also the creation of a department of Urban housing and Development and the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Following reports of unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on US destoryers Maddox and C Turner Joy in the Gulf of Tonkin on 2nd and 4th of August 1964 Congress passed a resolution giving the President the power to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression”. The resolution served as the principal constitutional authorization for the escalation of American military involvement in Vietnam. Repealed in 1970.
Ho Chi Minh Trail: elaborate system of paths and trails across mountains and jungles that was used by North Vietnam to supply the Viet Cong with troops and supplies.
Op. Rolling Thunder: codename for US bombing campaign against North Vietnam from March 1965 to October 1968.The attacks were intended to weaken the North and reduce their ability to wage war against the south. Shortly after the operation began Johnson committed the first ground troops to the war. While their initial mission was to defend US air bases in SV that were being used for the bombing raids, the troops’ role was soon expanded to include engaging the Viet Cong (VC) in direct combat. The war of attrition that resulted was a huge drain on both sides. Johnson finally called off the campaign in October 1968 and sought a negotiated settlement.
Protests against the Vietnam war marched on the Pentagon in October 1967.
The Pentagon Papers: In 1967, at a time when he was becoming increasingly sceptical about the role of the US in Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, asked a team of analysts in his department to prepare a study of US involvement in Vietnam from WWII to present day. Top secret. Finished in 1969. leaked to papers in 1971 by Daniel Ellsberg. It showed that US presidents, including Johnson, had misled the public about the degree of US involvement in Vietnam.
Tet Offensive: Late January 1968, during the New Year “Tet” holiday, NV and VC launched coordinated attack against a number of targets in the South. US and SV military forces suffer heavy loses but repel attacks. But extensive television reporting of the offensive (Cronkite, CBS anchor) made it clear to the American public that victory in Vietnam was not imminent and public support for US involvement in the war suffered as a consequence. Protests against the war intensified and on 31 March, Johnson announced that he would not stand for re-election as president.
Viet Minh - Founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1941, North Vietnamese army.
Viet Cong - NLF National liberation front. South Vietnamese guerilla force opposed to the US backed south vietnamese government and in favour of reunification.
McGeorge Bundy [special assistant for national security affairs} Initially BUndy was a forceful advocate of expanding US involvement in Vietnam. Feb 1965, after a visit to SV he wrote a memorandum proposing a policy of “sustained reprisal”, including air strikes, against NV if it didn’t end its guerilla warfare against the SV gov. Late, when he left the administration, he advised Johnson against further escalation of the conflict.
Le Duan: Military leader of the NV.
Lyndon B Johnson: Passed more legislation through congress than most presidents did in two terms. Successes: Civil Rights Act 1964 and Voting Rights Act 1965. Social reforms re his “Great Society” eg medicare and medicaid. JOhnson came under pressure from MLK as money intended for socio-economic reform was diverted to finance the escalating US involvement in the Vietnam War. Ultimately it was Johnson’s management of the war in Vietnam that caused support to drain away from his presidency, as increasing numbers of American troops were used to try to secure a ‘knock-out’ blow against the NV forces. However, from the American ‘Rolling Thunder’ offensive of 1965 to the Tet Offensive by NV troops in 1968, American casualties mounted and, as hopes of victory receded, a growing protest movement at home made Johnson’s position increasingly untenable. In March 1968. he announced his intention to initiate peace talks with the NV and shocked people by announcing that he would not contest the upcoming presidential elections.
Robert McNamara: As Secretary of Defense, McNamara initially advocated the deepening military involvement of the US in Vietnam, publicly expressing optimism that the NLF and its NV allies would soon give up. He was the Governments chief spokesperson on day-to-day operations of the war and Johnsons principal deputy in carrying out the war strategy. However as early as 1965, McNamara had privately begun questioning the wisdom of US involvement and by 1967 he was openly seeking a way to get a peace negotiation underway. He set up a top secret investigation of US commitment to Vietnam (Pentagon Papers). HIs opposition to continued bombing of NV lost him influence in the Johnson administration, from which he resigned in February 1968.
William Westmoreland: 1963, He was set to Vietnam to work with US military advisors. Soon after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 Westoreland was appointed commander of the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. His popularity at the time is evident in his being appointed a four-star general and being named Time magazine’s ‘Man of the Year’ for 1965. His war strategy in Vietnam has been described as a ‘war of attrition’, where the intention is to wear down the enemy by inflicting on-going heavy toll of casualties. The main criterion for success was the number of enemy troops killed (body counts). Over time the American public became sceptical of the figures issued by the US military and increasingly concerned about US casualties. In 1967 he was called back to the US to report to Congress on the conduct of the war. He promised congress that, with sufficient support, the US would win. Public opinion against the war continued to harden. Tet Offensive was the final straw for many Americans convincing them that the war was unwinnable. Westmoreland requested an additional 200,000 troops after Tet, Johnson initially deferred a response, then recalled Westmoreland to Washington to become army Chief of staff.
What changes in US policy towards Vietnam did Johnson make on becoming president?
l Even before the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of 10 August 1964, Johnson and his advisers had decided that greater American troop involvement was necessary.
l Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin incidents to persuade Congress to grant him extraordinary powers to deal with enemy attacks and prevent further aggression against US forces.
l Operation Rolling Thunder represented a major escalation of the war, with bombing raids on NV.
l Ground troops becoming involved in direct combat.
S1: William Bundy memorandum to LBJ 10 June 1964: The immediate watershed decision is whether or not the Administration should seek a Congressional resolution giving general authority for action which the President may judge necessary to defend the peace and security of the area. (David M. Barrett (ed.) Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Papers: a documentary collection. College Station: Texas A&M University Press)
SS1: LBJ was determined that it would not be he who would ‘Lose’ Vietnam to communism. Without a formal declaration of war, LBJ used the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to intensify US involvement in Vietnam, mobilising regular troops for deployment. From that point forward the conflict became known to many as “Johnson’s War”. (Christopher B. Strain (2017) The Long Sixties: America, 1955-1973.)
SS2: Spring 1965 VC attacked US base at Pleiku, this angered Johnson. “I’m not going to be the first president to lose a war,” said LBJ, and he changed US policy by ordering Rolling Thunder.He also decided that the only way to avoid defeat was to change policy again, and he sent a few thousand Marines. Previously, US troops were there to advise ARVN. Now the Commander in Chief gave those 25,000 soldier new orders - they could conduct combat missions with ARVN to search and destroy the enemy. Opinion polls demonstrated that about 80% supported bombing the North. (Terry Anderson (1991) The Sixties. New York: Longman)
What developments in management of the Vietnam conflict from 1965 on created increasing difficulties for Johnson?
l Even before the launch of Operation Rolling Thunder, leading members of the administration had advised the president that the prospects for stability in South Vietnam were poor and relations with the SV government were somewhat strained.
l Although Operation Rolling Thunder helped to stave off defeat in the South, an increase in troop numbers was required to allow the Americans to take the offensive against VIet Cong and NV forces.
l As criticism of the war mounted in the US, the president decided it was necessary to exaggerate rates of progress in order to justify the case for keeping the war going. However, as the challenges faced by American forces became more evident and the number of US casualties increased, criticism of the president became more vocal and leading advisers either resigned or were forced to resign.
S6: Memo by McGeorge Bundy to P. LBJ, 27th January 1965. Bob McNamara and I have asked for a meeting with you at 11:30 in order to have a very private discussion of the basic situation in Vietnam. Both of us are now convinced that our current policy can only lead to disastrous defeat. What we are doing now, essentially, is to wait and hope for a stable government. In the last six weeks that effort has been unsuccessful. The underlying difficulties in Saigon arise from the spreading conviction that our future is without hope for anti-communists. Our best friends have been somewhat discouraged by our own activity in the face of major attacks on our installations. The Vietnamese know just as well as we do that the VC are gaining in the countryside. They feel that we are unwilling to take serious risks. In one sense, all of this is outrageous, in light of all that we have done and all that we are ready to do if they will only pull up their socks. (David M. Barrett. LBJ’s Vietnam Papers: A Documentary Collection P101)
S7: McGeorge Bundy memo April 6th 1965: President approved action: slow ascending tempo of Op. RT. Leaflet operations.
SS3: July 1965 LBJ americanize the war. Faced with the prospect of losing SV to the communists, the president announced that US combat strength would immediately be increased from 75,000 to 125,000 and that additional US forces would be sent when requested by field commander Gen. Westmoreland. LBJ travelled to Honolulu in Feb. 1966 to get a first hand assessment on the war’s progress from westmoreland and to secure commitments from SV PM Nguyen Cao Ky (New Yan Cow Koi). It was his first trip outside US since becoming president. Trip galvanized public attention and PM Ky on cover of Time Magazine. Westmoreland told LBJ that July troops staved off defeat but additional troops would now be needed to take the military initiative. LBJ reluctantly agreed to a dramatic increase in US troop strength from 184000 to 429000 by the end of the year. (Larry Berman (1989) Lyndon Johnson’s War: The road to Stalemate in VIetnam p9-10)
LBJ made 2 visits to Vietnam as president (26th October 1966 and 23 December 1967).
8th December 1965 McGeorge Bundy resigned as LBJ’s special assistant for National Security affairs.
SS4: LBJ’s policy was slowly slipping the war into a stalemate. A free press, the legitimacy of political opposition, and the attentive citizenry forced Johnson to exaggerate rates of progress in order to keep the war going. Operating under restraints imposed by the president, the military commanders recognized that Vietnam would be a long war. Stalemate was tantamount to victory for Hanoi. (Larry Berman (1989) Lyndon Johnson’s war: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam)
SS5: A government-sponsored study of the effects of OP. RT concluded soberly that as of July 1966 “the US bombing of NV had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi’s ability to mount and support military operations in the South at the current level.” It was estimated that it took an average of a hundred tons of bombs dropped along the {Ho Chi Minh} trail to kill a single NV soldier.
When Defense Secretary Robert McNamara read this report in the fall of 1966, it furthered his growing personal disillusionment with the war. Memo from him to LBJ May 1967: “There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the US to go. The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on the issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. Pp183-4 Maurice Isserman and Michael Kalin (2012) America Divided’)
30th November 1967 – Robert McNamara resigned.
What role did the Vietnam War play in Johnson’s decision of March 1968 not to seek another term as president?
· The worsening domestic divisions – caused by the mounting casualty list of US soldiers and the failure to make an effective military breakthrough – were emotionally draining for Johnson, who came to believe that these divisions could better be resolved if he did not seek another term as president.
· TV coverage of the Tet offensive persuaded Johnson that he was losing popular support for his war strategy
· Key advisers and former advisers, as well as friends in the media, told Johnson that his strategy was not working and that he needed to re-think his position.
· Recalling Westmoreland from Vietnam was an admission that the Administration’s policy on Vietnam needed re-thinking.
· In the Democratic Party primaries to choose a candidate for the 1968 presidential election, the performances of critics such as Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy showed there was significant opposition to LBJ’s Vietnam policy within his own party.
· His response to the personal testimony of his own son-in-law, Capt Charles Robb, seemed to epitomize the enormous toll the strain of managing the war was having on Johnson’s health.
S14: 31 March 1968: LBJ “I shall not seek, and will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President”
Cronkite’s declaration that the war was a stalemate had huge impact on public opinion. Credibility gap. LBJ “If I’ve lost Cronkite then I’ve lost America”
S15: Letter from Drew Pearson, most popular newspaper columnist of his day, to LBJ 11 March 1968. Print p42
Westmoreland requested 200,000 more troops to win a total war.
A change in policy: SS7: 23 March 1968 Westmoreland “kicked upstairs” (Larry Berman)
S16: Note from Lawrence O’Brien to LBJ: “I’ve spoke to many Democratic officials…people who are your supporters…and also without exceptions they express serious concerns about our current posture in Vietnam. These views are becoming more widespread”. (David M. Barrett 1997)
SS8 David L. Anderson (2005): the meetings of 26-27 March led him to sense that the V. enemy was too strong and the popular approval in the US to weak to continue the course he had been following. On 31 March he informed the nation via tv that he limited bombing and offered negotiations.
SS9: Christopher B. Strain (2017) the long sixties: Johnson was in fact a broken man by 1968. In his defense, Johnson was held responsible not only for his own mistakes but also for mistakes made by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, and if LBJ had been duped, then so too were America’s best strategists and military men. Johnson could neither end it or admit defeat, and such was his undoing. The decline of the Great Society unquestionably paralleled the failure of his efforts in Vietnam: the worse things got overseas, the more the war overshadowed his legacy of reform. As Martin Luther King Jr. lamented “The promises of the Great Society had been shot down on the battlefields of Vietnam”
SA: In the defense Johnson was held responsible not only for his own mistakes but also for mistakes made by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, and if LBJ had been duped, then so too were America’s best strategists and military men. Chris B. Strain (2017)
SB: Johnson’s decision to remove himself from the re-nomination race represented the ultimate recognition that the Vietnam war had become interwoven with his personality and his presidency. “I shall not accept” was the president’s admission that Vietnam had become, against his every desire, Lyndon Johnson’s war”. Larry Berman (1989)
SC:LBJ and his advisers began bombing NV in early 1965 in a desperate attempt to spur political resolve in SV. But their efforts boomeranged wildly. Rather than stabilising the situation, it instead unleashed forces that soon put Johnson at the mercy of circumstances, a hostage to the war’s accelerating momentum. Brian Van DeMark (1991)
SD: Johnson’s 31 March announcement of his political retirement… at the end of a speech on “our search for peace in Vietnam” was, in effect, clear evidence of the high correlation between his personal political leadership and the conduct of the American war. David L. Anderson (2005)
SE: The Johnson administration was bitterly divided over how to react to the enemy initiative. Not until 31 March - 2 months after the Tet Offensive began - did Johnson make a major statement on Vietnam. Chester J. Pach, Jr (1994)
SF: McNamara, Westmoreland, and Johnson - the architects of US policy in VIetnam - had fallen. Their departures reflected a recognition that the idea of military victory had been a ‘dangerous illusion’. Larry Berman (1989)
SG: President Johnson was being told by McNamara and the other foreign policy advisers he had inherited from JFK that, however unpromising the situation in SV appeared, the US had to stay the course. Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin (2012)
SH: Enroute {to Cam Rahn Bay, October 1966} Johnson awarded Westmoreland the Distinguished Service Cross. Never, said the general, had Johnson tried to tell him how to run the war. Tactics and battlefield strategy were left to him. Vaughn David Bornet (1983)
